Merton's Norms: The Social Structure of Science
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Updated on: April 15, 2004
In 1942, Robert K. Merton described four norms, or "institutional imperatives", in which he believed scientists follow (ref. 1): I) Universalism, II) Communism, III) Disinterestedness, and IV) Organized Scepticism. Merton's descriptions of these norms are summarized below.
I. Universalism
II. Communism
III. Disinterestedness
IV. Organized Scepticism
Analysis of Merton's Norms:
As suggested by Barnes and Dolby (ref. 7), Merton's norms "represent attempts to describe institutional constraints upon the way the scientist thinks and acts with respect to the published results of his peers. They are based on the view that a specifically 'scientific approach' exists common to the evaluative procedures of all scientists, and specific to them". For example, "universalism" is not specific to science, and therefore cannot be a norm to distinguish "science" from other societies or institutions. Merton indicated that "secrecy is the antithesis" of communism (ref. 6). Although collaboration does occur frequently, secrecy does play a role in particular scientific settings. In modern times, some scientists have become increasingly business oriented (e.g. scientists who work in industry type settings). Secrecy abounds in industrial research, between biotech companies, and between countries. The goal in business is to make money. Thus, secrecy is needed to compete effectively. Yet, some level of secrecy is acceptable, even for academic researchers. This is to avoid being 'scooped' on a particular idea. Once the work is published, it enters the public domain and the knowledge becomes available to everyone. And, the credit goes to the publishing authors. "Disinterestedness" does not seem to be a norm either, as scientists often do become emotionally attached to their work. Often "pet theories" are held onto despite major opposition. With the time and effort one has spent in developing a theory, a researcher might feel it was all "just a waste of time" if the theory were to be rejected by the scientific community. Scientists defend their territory as people do in other social groups. However, to be a really good scientist, one should look at all valid alternative hypotheses (including the null hypothesis), and accept the one that is supported by the evidence. This really is how science works, though. Scientific progress comes through the rejection of weakly supported hypotheses and acceptance of those that are strongly supported. "Organized skepticism" -- i.e. waiting for "all the facts to be in" before making judgements -- does not seem to be a reasonable norm. Even for apparently small problems, the time and effort required would be too great (e.g. the solar system could end before "all the facts are in"). Theories are often put forth before anything is known about the actual mechanisms behind particular observations. Research is ongoing. Publications represent work that has been done and ultimately gives way to further studies.
Overall, these norms are either too ambiguous to be specific to science (e.g. universalism), or they are the direct opposite of how scientists actually behave in particular settings. Merton himself indicated that his study into "the ethos of modern science is only a limited introduction to a larger problem: the comparative study of the institutional structure of science" (ref. 8). In my opinion, any broad generalization of a human social group may be useful to help understand the workings of a group. But this works in general only, and not necessarily to specific cases. The social or political context in which the members of a particular group interact, or in which the group interacts with other social groups, needs to be specifically described before meaningful interpretations of human behaviour can be made.
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