Chapter 4

Chapter 4 The Mind-Body Problem

Hegel does not deal with any of the usual Mind-Body problems. His concept of Geist prevents those problems from ever arising. In only one section of the Phanomenologie does he even discuss the interaction issue, the previously mentioned section on Phrenology. He says: "Brain and Spinal cord...may be looked at as the immediate presence of self-consciousness..."[1] But this is the case only in the perspective of another person. The self-consciousness "...qua abiding character and self-moving conscious activity exists for itself and within itself."[2] Hegel argues that Geist is a thing, since it is.[3] But "...what is 'thing' in this case is self-consciousness; 'thing' here is the unity of ego and being - the Category." [4] And: "The true being of man is...his act; individuality is real in the deed, and a deed it is which cancels both the aspects of what is 'meant' or 'presumed' to be."[5] The Category as self-consciousness, as man's act, is the substance of both individual Geist and collective Geist. By equating self-consciousness and act in the concept of Geist the interaction issue never arises.

Hegel, on the whole, takes the Mind-Body problem lightly. He presents a rather light-hearted reductio ad absurdum of the phrenologist's thesis in one instance[6] and later says:

When, therefore, a man is told, 'You (your inner being) are so and so,

because your skull-bone is so constituted,' this means nothing else than

that we regard a bone as the man's reality. To retort upon such a

statement with a box on the ear removes primarily the 'soft' parts of his

head from their apparent dignity and position, and proves merely that

these are no true inherent nature, are not the reality of mind; the retort

here would, properly speaking, have to go the length of breaking the

skull of the person who makes a statement like that, in order to

demonstrate to him in a manner as palpable as his own wisdom that a

bone is nothing of an inherent nature at all for a man, still less his true

reality.[7]

Hegel treats this central Mind-Body problem so lightly because he believed Kant had solved it. Hegel accepts as his starting point several basic elements in Kant's thought. Since Kant dismissed the usual interaction problem and replaced it with ego and the "thing-in-itself," with the categories of the understanding and the forms of perception as the interaction site, the categories and forms are the solution. Hegel accepts Kant's position that we contribute to experience the categories by which we have that experience. Hegel also accepts Kant's position that what we recognize as "objects" are real objects.[8] Hegel disagrees with Kant on the nature of ego, the "thing-in-itself," and the categories. For Kant, the ego and the "thing-in-itself" are out of the range of the categories. Yet Kant claims that the categories are such that my experience of objects is not limited to me but are experienced by others as well. The "thing-in-itself" is the cause of this shared experience. Hegel claims Kant takes an illegitimate step in positing the "thing-in-itself" as the cause of this shared experience. Hegel's move is to say the cause of the shared experience is Geist. "Self-consciousness found the thing in the form of itself, and itself in the form of the thing; that is to say, self-consciousness is explicitly aware of being in itself the objective reality."[9] But Geist is not always this, only at the stage one step past Kant. Geist is not a constant, defined once and remaining the same throughout the Phanomenologie. The book traces the evolution of Geist from even before its origination through to Absolute Knowledge (Geist knowing itself as Geist.)

The book begins with the "I" and "This" of "sense-certainty" where the "I" does not think.[10] This is not Geist collective or individual. It is instead "the mere history of its (sense-certainty's) process - of its experience; and sense-certainty itself is nothing else than simply this history."[11] This stage evolves into "Perception" in which consciousness begins having thoughts in the form of "unconditional universals."[12] The next step is that of "Understanding." In this section consciousness comes to believe in "two forces."[13]

These two forces exist as independent entities: but their existence

lies in a movement each toward each, of such a kind that in order

to be, each has in reality to get its position purely through the other;

that is to say, their being has purely the significance of disappearance.[14]

These two forces are, in effect, the Kantian Pure Ego and the "thing-in-itself." Neither can be observed in itself, but only where they interact as phenomena. Kant had developed the thesis that all experience took place as the interaction of these two forces. Hegel claims, however, that:

We see that in the inner being of the sphere of appearance,

understanding gets to know in truth nothing else but appearance

itself, not, however, appearance in the shape of a play of forces,

but that play of forces in its absolutely universal moments and in

the process of those moments; in fact, understanding merely

experiences itself.[15]

This step does away with the two Kantian forces and leaves only the interaction. It is accomplished as consciousness becomes self-conscious.

In reaching the level of self-consciousness there is a distinction. The distinction is not simply "its self as such from itself" since this would not be a distinction (I am I.)

For self-consciousness...otherness is a fact, it does

not exist as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself

with this difference is also a fact for self-consciousness

and is a second distinct moment.[16]

Up to this point Geist does not come into view. It is not even mentioned after the Introduction. The whole section deals with the "I." Indeed, in this respect, the analogy made by Butler between Hegel and Freud is very accurate.[17] Hegel mentions an appeal to "universal experience"[18] but this indicates only that he believes everyone has gone through this experience individually. He also makes a brief comparison between sense-certainty and Skepticism.[19] Geist, however, has not come on the scene. So there is, as yet, no Phanomeologie des Geistes, only the foundation for it.

Geist arises when the self-consciousness becomes a fact.[20] It is "the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of the substance."[21] Hegel then traces the evolution of the concept through its individual and historical stages.

Geist is anthropomorphic. It is "Man writ large," so to speak. Its evolution is like the maturation of an individual from the conditions of his birth through to his incorporation with the Divine. Yet it is not anthropomorphic in that it is the Ground of all that is, even of itself. It is Hegel's answer to the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" But as George J. Seidel says, for Hegel, "...things or facts do not grow out of the ground as do plants."[22] Instead Geist as ground disappears as it becomes something factual.[23] This is the case because we do not recognize it until it is itself a fact. That is until there is self-consciousness. It is also beyond the anthropomorphic in that, the Divine, the individual becomes incorporated with its Absolute Geist. Geist is thus fundamentally religious. As religious, Geist is the Logos, the "Word made flesh" because it is concrete Geist as the language, knowledge, nature, ethics, religion, art, philosophy and customs of man; and because as Jesus Christ, the Absolute, becomes Being as flesh and thus becomes Absolute Geist.

But, Geist is also epistemological. It is the key concept by which Hegel goes beyond Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Hegel unites the categories (now expanded as the language of man) with the "thing-in-itself." But as a philosophical concept Geist is more than epistemological. The evolution of Geist includes the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy is the evolution of man's self-consciousness and so the evolution of Geist's self-consciousness. They are one and the same. As the evolution of man's self-consciousness, the history of philosophy is a creative force. It's the individual philosophers who each make a contribution to the evolution of Geist by means of their philosophical contributions. This is why Hegel describes a culture, or a stage of Geist, such as the Greek, Oriental, and Christian "worlds" in terms of their respective philosophical traditions. For Hegel the development of philosophical thought is soon followed by the actual development of the real world. This is why Hegel was so excited about his "discovery." He was, himself, advancing the nature of Geist by his very description of it. He was thus considering his individual Geist as identical with the collective Geist. It is no wonder that for him the distinction between individual Geist and collective Geist was unproblematic.

Geist, thus, is Hegel's solution to the problem of empiricism and the Mind-Body problem. But, with this comes the distinction between collective and individual Geist. For Hegel alone could this distinction be unproblematic. Geist is made up of individuals each having a "mind" and the collective "spirit" of the group or community to which the individuals belong. The dual nature of the word "Geist" has hidden the nature of this distinction by appearing as ambiguity. The conflict over which interpretation of "ambiguous" Geist was the correct interpretation blocks the realization that there are two types of Geist. The question now moves on to the nature of the relationship between collective and individual Geist. In describing this relationship, similarities between Hegel and some representative, contemporary thinkers is of interest. Such a comparison clarifies Hegel's conception of Geist and shows that the relationship between collective and individual Geist is problematic for those thinkers.

Contents Chapter 5

[1] Hegel, op. cit. Phen. P. 353, Phan. P. 253

[3] This shows Hegel's acceptance of the Scholastic concept of "Substance."

[4] Hegel, op. cit. Phen. P. 369, Phan. P. 268

[8] Robert C. Solomon. "Hegel's Epistemology" American Philosophical Quarterly 11 October 1974 pp. 277-289 p. 280

[9] Hegel, op. cit. Phen. P. 375, Phan. P. 271

[18] Hegel, op. cit. Phen. P. 158, Phan. P. 90

[22] George J. Seidel, O.S.B. "Hegel on Ground" Idealistic Studies 1 1971 pp. 219-226 p. 224