This thesis has introduced a new interpretation of Hegel's Geist that more clearly shows Hegel's importance with respect to contemporary thought. In doing so, not nearly enough has been said to show that many of Hegel's contemporaries, Goethe, Holderlin, to name two, held similar views to Hegel's and were also very influential. The possibility that many others developed similar views without being influenced by Hegel has also been left undeveloped. This has been especially the case with regard to the treatment of Berger, Dewey and Wittgenstein. While it is the case that Dewey admits Hegel's influence on his thought, Berger only mentions Hegel in passing and does not indicate that he recognizes the similarity between his own thought and Hegel's. Wittgenstein never even mentions Hegel.
However, if this were not the case there would be little point in considering this interpretation of Hegel's Geist as a new interpretation, or that it shows Hegel's importance with respect to contemporary thought. The main point is that this new interpretation both fits Hegel's work and shows essential similarities between Hegel's thought and contemporary thought.
These similarities begin with the epistemological view that there is no mind-matter distinction which forever separates what we can know from what there is. Instead, there is a distinction between the collective and the individual. This is not simply a distinction between an individual and many individuals but is a distinction between the individual and reality as socially constructed. This is the distinction between individual Geist and collective Geist. Dewey works with this distinction between Organic Structures and the individual; Berger, between Socially Constructed Reality and the individual; Wittgenstein between Forms of Life and the individual. It is Berger's terminology that is most in vogue. It is also the clearest description of the distinction, since he deals most effectively with it.
The acceptance of this Hegelian dualism by contemporary thinkers also explains precisely why the problem of consistency is so difficult for them. Dewey, Berger, and Wittgenstein, each in their own way, experiences the problem of consistency. Understanding their problem in terms of individual Geist and collective Geist show the problem with consistency to be essentially one of man's ability to hold his world together. Describing today as the "age of skepticism" indicates the lack of faith we have in our ability to maintain reality as humanly significant.
The similarities Hegel's treatment of religion has with contemporary thinking on the subject are also more easily seen through this new interpretation of Geist. That religion is associated with a social context is clearly related to Hegel's association of religion with the stages of Geist or social consciousness. The distinction between individual Geist and collective Geist also shows the importance of religion for world-maintenance. The integral connection between God and Geist also intensifies our understanding of the importance of God for the function of religion. It is in this, that this new interpretation of Geist may be most practical. For it suggests, that in order to introduce greater consistency and stability to our collective consciousness, a consistent and stable conception of God is needed. It also suggests which conception of God may be most effective, that of Jesus Christ as God, the "Word made flesh."
This of course suggests that introducing more consistency and stability to our collective consciousness is a good idea; which suggestion need not be considered fundamental to the purpose of this thesis.
The treatment of Existentialism and Marxism certainly suggests that they are not highly regarded. It is admitted that there is much to be learned by a study of Existentialism and Marxism. But, if an element of progress is to be considered possible in the enterprise of philosophy, it is in contemporary Western thought that progress is being made. Existentialism and Marxism being retrogressive with respect to their Hegelian foundations.
The suggestion that Western thought is making progress with respect to its Hegelian foundation is primarily a reference to the concern with the individual - collective relationship, a concern ignored by both the individualism of Existentialism and the collectivism of Marxism. Such suggestions obviously hold an importance for myself and serve to indicate how much more could have been said in the body of this thesis but has been left out. One may think of ancient oriental landscape painting in this respect. It is what has been left out that is most important.