PzKpfw V Ausf. D/A/G Panther


PzKpfw. V Panther Ausf. A (1943)

Weigth 45,5 tons
Crew 5
Weapons 75mm L70 KwK 42 gun with 82 rounds, 2 7,92mm MG 34 with 4500 rounds
Armor hull 15-80mm (nose and sloped plate 80mm@55º, sides 40mm@40º, rear 40mm, top 15mm, bottom 20mm+13mm); turret 15-120mm (front 110-120mm, sides and rear 45mm, top 15mm)
Engine 690hp gasoline Maybach HL 230 P30, 12-cylinders on V, liquid cooled
Speed 46Km/h
Autonomy 177Km
Length (max) 8,86m
Width 3,30m
Height 2,95m

Advantages: heavy front armor protection, heavy fire power on vast ranges, all-terrain speed

Disadvantages: the continuous variations in design took the early models to be un-reliable while the following, also if improved, took such an heir with them, weak side and rear armor protection

A new design

Guderian reports about the heavy losses the 4th Panzerdivision took by hand of Soviet T-34s and KVs in the Kamenewo area did the Germans changing their minds about tank design: the sloped plates gave the T-34 an almost perfect ballistic design; its advanced Diesel engine and Christie suspensions system let it moving fast cross-country; its powerful gun, while placed in an imperfect two-men turret, was able to destroy any known German tank at the date.

A new, radically re-designed tank had to be designed to counter the threat. Order was put for 35 tons vehicle with 100mm thick front turret and 60mm thick front hull armor, a long 75mm gun and a speed of 60 Km/h. Daimler Benz's VK 3002 (DB) was really an (improved) copy of the Soviet vehicle but it was rejected because of the difficult to replicate the Soviet Diesel duralluminium engine and of the design being too much different from actual panzer designing traditions. MAN, instead, presented a more conventional VK 3002 (M) project, with a 120mm thick front turret (designed by Rheinmetall-Borsig, after the succesful German three men turret system) placed in mid hull position, 80mm thick front and 40mm side hull armor, a 650Hp petrol engine and the 75mm L70 KwK 42 tank-gun (muzzle speed of 935 m/s), designed for this tank. After quick trials MAN's model was accepted and standardized as the PanzerKampfWagen V Panther Ausf. A (different from the later serial production Ausf. A) (Sd.Kfz. 171).

Panther Ausf. D/A armor scheme (Photo by Valera Potapov)

Production started on December 1942 and on the following January the pre-production model Ausf. A (then renamed D1) began to walk out of the factory carrying only a 60mm front plate. This null-serie was employed exclusively for training and testing purposes. Standard PanzerKampfwagen V Ausf. D2 (then renamed simply Ausf. D) Panther followed in February 1943: 59 panzers in March, 78 in April, 324 in May and 172 in June. From May 1943 Panthers in service were 324 and schurzen (side armor skirts against anti-tank rifles and HEAT rounds) were added to the sides to cover the space between the tracks and the upper hull. The succesfull use of these armor skirts, which prevented the Russian anti-tank rifles from penetrating the vertical 40mm lower side hull plate, was just another point which turned away the planned up-armored Panther II.

The 75mm KwK 42 L70 was an excellent gun: it was very accurate thanks to his flat trajectory and hard hitting (it penetrated a vertical 170mm plate at 1,000 meters). The use of Pz.Gr.Patr. 40/42 (APCR round, initial muzzle speed of 1,120 m/s) gave excellent results against the heavist enemy tank. Lt. Berger, from Grossdeautschland remembered:

"At ranges of 1,000 meters we reckoned with 90 percent hits. Normally a hit, would result in the destruction of an enemy vehicle, even Stalin's' heavy tanks. We, however, had supply problems with the high performance Pz.Gr.Patr. 40/42 ... Firing with HE rounds gave similar accuracy, but the impact was significantly inferior to the 88mm rounds ..."

However the tank was far to be ready for action as the German High Command's rush for these new tanks did not give the time to fully develope them. Among them, Reichminister Speer and his advisor introduced a sub-contracting system which made possible to realize the Panther tank in a relatively brief time. This had a dark-side in the on-the-run changes urged by Hitler himself which increased the tank weight: components which had already been designed (for a 10 metric tons lighther vehicle) and were in manufacturing progress (road wheels, gear boxes, final drive and steering system, etc) proved then to be overloaded.

The AK7 200 gear box was particularly weak and the improved Maybach HL 230 engine tended to overheat and emitt flames. The increased weight made a huge pression upon the wheels' bolts with following yelding: much time was needed to reach the damaged point and do repairs.

Panther Ausf. D, 1Oth Panzerbrigade, Bielgorod sector, Summer 1943

Panthers in action!

Despite Guderian's warnings, Hitler's desire to employ these tanks in the up-coming "Operation Zitadelle" (the assault on the Kursk salient) conducted to a disaster. Not fully developed Panther were simply too ready to mechanical faults and the engine easily over-heated: of the 200 Panthers the 4th Panzer Armee had on July 4th 1943 (most in the ad-hoc formed 10th Panzerbrigade with panzer abteilung 51 and 52 and the others assigned to several companies of privileged units such as the GD and the IInd SS Panzerkorps's divisions) only 43 were still functional the following day (note that Panther's problems were known as the large complement of tanks to the two battalions was seen as remedy to this). Grossdeautschland Panzerregiment reported to have lost six of its brand new Panthers while moving towards the attack positions because of technical failures. In the mid-day of July 4th the same unit had a quarter of its Panther broken-down and by July 5th it has lost the 80% of its Panthers! Gefreiter Werner Kriegel of Pz.Abt. 51 remembers:

"[...] By the evening of 5th, Pz.Abt. 51 had only 22 Panthers operationa. Some 28 were totally destroyed, the rest damaged. My comrades complained about the final final drives and of their engines overheating. The engine compartiment was very tight because of UK equipment (diving equipement) ... On the 8th of July we again headed for Oboyan south of Kursk. Our tank received a hit form a tank gun at the commander's cupola. We carried on the attack with an open hatch and a cracked cupola. My commander shill has the shell ... We lost one tank to one of those heavy assault guns [SU-152], the mantlet was simply penetrated. We also met American tanks [M3A3 Lee-Grant] which were no match for us ... We destroyed a number of T-34s at ranges well over 2,500 meters ..."

He also remembered some other anecdotes to underline Panther's engine compartment defects: it was too tight as it was designed to be fully sealed and did not let a proper flux of air to cool the engine down. Gaskets defects added to this as well.

"Our platoon moved through a pine forest. The vibrations of the heavy tanks resulted in a steady 'rain' of pine needles. After a short time, the first tank broke down, and other followed. We examined the incident. The pineneedles had fallen into the air inlets and blocked it. The respective engines had stopped almost immediately. As a stop-gap solution we welded a perforated bucket over the rear air inlet".

"We were not satisfied with the Maybach. Many problems already occurred before Kursk ... We had some engine fires due to fuel that was spread from the carburators over the hot exhaust. Here it ignited and burned electric linings and gaskets ... Later these problems were generally solved. I, however, won't forget the glowing exhausts. Occasionally, Ivan used to target them at night ..."

But these were problems due to urgent needs: while Germany's driving force at Kursk was ending, next version Panther Ausf. A was on the assembly lines. A hull ball mounted MG 34 (Kugelblende 80) was installed and a new cupola with seven iposcopes, more heavily armored and much better shaped, replaced the old one with vision slits. To mild the weight's effects upon the bolts, more of them were used: 24 rather than 16. Previous Ausf. D were modified by adding other 16 bolts between the others pre-existent, taking the total number to 32. But while the engine became more stable, thanks to additional cooling fans on the rear deck, the transmission remained weak in all series despite the efforts in strngthening the final drive. By then Panther became a truly feared opponent, for both Soviets and Western Allies.

Panther Ausf. A on its way to the front!

In 1944 it was clear that Germany would never be able to start production of the improved Panther II: some of the features thought for this tank were then shifted to the standard Panther. From February 1944 new PzKpfw. Panther Ausf. G was ready. The sides were modified to integrate the storage rooms and made thicker to 50 mm at 40 degrees. The driver sight was no more, replaced by a rotating periscope on the hull roof. Early models had the same Ausf. A turret but a re-designed and thicker gun shield to avoid the shots trap was installed in later types. In Autumn 1944 standard rubber-cushioned roadwheels were replaced by steel-rimmed ones in a small series, while an improved AK7 400 gear box was used. Before war ended it was also experimented a night-fighting infra-red sighting device capable to identify targets up to 500 meters: 1,000 devices were manufactured but never used in mass night operations, such as Guderian envisioned.

In Normandy, the Ausf. As and Gs took an important role: their 75mm, being capable of piercing 120mm thick armor at 30 degrees on 1,000 metres ranges proved to be ravaging to the less protected and armed Allies: only the crushing numerical superiority, in land, air and naval guns fire, avoided that a technological advantage would had become strategically decisive. On June 22nd 1944, a little later then Allied landings, the Russians launched their attack beared to destroy the Heersgruppe Mitte (Army group center). New heavy IS-IIs and assault guns were committed against the defensive position and supported the other Red Army massed formations (mainly T-34s). The Germans, without any major armored reserve (mainly committed in West Ukraine), were overwhelmed and took until August to panzer reinforcements to arrive and counter-attack the Soviets, halting them on the Vistula river (thanks to the overextended Soviet supply lines).

Panther Ausf. G, 1944 destroyed during Operation Bagration. The modified gun-mantlet and the front/side hull modifications are "immediately" visible.
(Photo by [...])

Combat and Experience Report on the Action near Wilkowischken from 9 to 11 August 1944 by Oberfeldwebel Heinz Bergmann of the 4. Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment 26 (Extract from T. Jentz's Panther book, courtesy of Rob White's Panther page).

The East Prussian border was threatened. The enemy had succeeded in reaching Wilkowischken. Counter measures were initiated. During the night of 8/9 August, heavy Panzers, Artillerie, Fusiliers, Grenadiers and Flak came rolling together on the roads Ebenrode-Eydtkau-Wirballen and gathered in the assembly area. It is the best division in the East, "Grosssdeutchland" with its attached units. The fire fighters of the East as they are called. It had the objectives of pushing back this corner of the Front and to retake Wilkowischken.

The assembly area was lit by the dawn and quiet reigned. A gigantic portrait of military might and power had gathered here in a confined area. Punctually at the ordered time for the attack, the motors started and their droning ripped through the still of the morning. Like an avalanche, the impregnable spearhead rolled toward the enemy main battle line and bored through. Closely followed by the Fusiliers and Grenadiers enlivened by a spirit to attack against which every resistance must break. Also, the enemy is awakened and sent his artillery and motar shells against the juggernaut.

Enemy destroyer aircraft attack in waves attempting to force a halt. Fountains of earth climb skyward. Sheds in which the enemy take cover, go up in smoke and flames. Unstoppable, the spearhead advanced toward Wilkowischken, grinding guns and positions underneath. Often in man-to-man combat, the Fusiliers and Grenadiers engage the tough and stubborn enemy. At about 1200 hours, the city is in our hands. The battlefield shows the mark of heavy combat. The enemy has lost large quantities of both men and material. Positions were established to defend the city.

Toward the southeast, in the rear of the city, two Panthers pulled into their defensive area. Russian tanks were reported. Not a half hour had passed when four Russian tanks approached the city from from the southeast. They were spotted immediately, but the range was still too long. Then they disappeared into a depression. Will they come up again is the question. There, somewhat left, all four appeared in a line at a range of 1300 meters. Now their full size was seen and the defenders opened fire. Five shots quickly followed each other and three columns of smoke stand out against the sky. The fourth was lucky to turn right and disappeared into a patch of woods. Was it only an advanced spearhead? Will still more follow or were they recon vehicles? The eyes of the commanders search the terrain. But nothing stirs.

Destroyed Panther Ausf. A

Twilight slowly enveloped the terrain in darkness. What will the next day bring? Will the Russians try to counterattack and retake the city or not? The leader decided to change to another position to get a better field of fire. During the night running motors from moving tanks were heard. Toward morning, a Panther was called back for resupply and the other Panther had to take over the entire defense.

Daybreak has long since passed and an attack was no expected when out of the depression at full speed fourteen Russian tanks carrying infantry charged toward the defending Panther. The loader was outside well away from the Panther finishing his business when shelling forced him to take cover. This made the situation more difficult. The driver took his place and fire was opened at a range of 1000 meters. Shot after shot was sent toward the attacker. The enemy had charged to within 600 meters turned right and disappeared into a hole. Four enemy tanks remained as smoking wrecks on the track. An immediate call on the radio alerted the defenders positioned further to the north. They managed to destroy six of the ten remaining tanks. Driving wildly, the rest escaped. An attack behind our front had been repulsed and cost the enemy heavy losses.

Again the defending Panther changed his position. After an hour, the second Panther returned from being resupplied and took up his defensive position. The enemy hadn’t given up their attempt to enter the city. During the afternoon, the enemy with an infantry battalion supported by four SU assault guns, under cover of the tall corn fields, tried twice to break in from the southeast. But, both attacks were completely repulsed by the two defending Panthers. All four SU assault guns that took part in both of these attacks were shot up. Two Panthers defending the city from the south and southeast had broke up two tank and two infantry attacks. The enemy suffered the loss of eleven tanks and very heavy losses of men.

The German late tanks all have in common the gasoline engine that, while being powerful, required continuous cares and need to be heavily cooled because they had the tendency to flame when hit or over-heated. The standard Maybach HL 230 P30 had a nominal power of 700 Hp at 3,000 rpm but maintaining the engine on this values did it to overheat and get flaming! The German driver handbook dictated to not go over the 2,500 rpm, which reduced the power output to a few over 600 Hp. The Panther could get an emergency 'power reserve' for a few minutes to reach the speed of 55 Kmh before immediate 'normal condition' had to be restored but the Tiger II could not.

Panther variants

The Panther was saw as the standard Panzer on which to base all heavy armored vehicles, ideally replacing all previous medium panzer designs such Pz III & IV and their variants. While standardization was the objective, war requirements stretched the need for immediate disposal of tanks. When Guderian was nominated Inspector of Panzertruppen in March 1943, he found that orders had been laid for Panzer IV's production stopped at all: with the Panther just coming out from the factory in few numbers and affected by the teething problems typical of the new vehicles, "this kind of innovation made me think only one thing: once the Panzer IV's production would have been stopped, the German Army would have been reduced to only a molthly production of 25 Tiger tanks and condamned for conseguence to bleed in the short time" (Guderian).

That's why the Panther came to flank the other panzers instead that replacing them. Anyway, as war progressed and the other tank designs became obsolete, Panther production was reaching its most. When the Panther was still being designed, plans had already been laid by various firms such as Krupp to use Panther components as base for a vast number of armored vehicles, such as heavy field howitzers and also a 280mm guns. Because of the war only the most immediately and useful projects were speeded up and accepted. Among them a command tank based on the standard Panther, a heavy recovery vehicle, a tank destroyer and a small number of artillery and ground-to-air observer tanks. Plans were also for a FlaK design but they did not go over the prototype stage.

Panzerbefehlswagen Panther

One of the most big advantage (and basis) of the German armored units was the abily of the commander to fully control his formations down to the single tank: also the lightest tank had at least a radio receiver. This meant that commander's tanks had to be equipped with more powerful (long range) radios as bigger where the formation they controlled. The first command tanks were appositely modified obsolete Panzers such as the Pz. I: heavy modifications were needed to gain room for the radio equipment and this preminent look made them easily recognizable by the enemy during combat, that is primary targets. As big numbers of modern tanks appeared it was possible to give the commanders modified Panzer IIIs which traded off ammunition loads for radios but permitted them to follow the action of the other tanks, greatly reducing their risk.

A Befehlpanther Ausf. D

First Panther units had infact some befehlwagen IIIs but as Panther's production increased Panzerbefehlswagen Panthers (Sd.Kfz. 267) begun to appear. During production run a percentage between 5 and 10 percent (depending upon field losses) was allotted for the conversion (which was accomplished at the factory): from July 1944 the change was made possible on the field by adding the mountings on all tanks. The standard Fu 5 radio was moved in the turret along with the 2 meters rod antenna on the roof. A Fu 8 radio set (range of 70 Km, meant to maintain contact at battalion/regimental level) was mounted in the hull. Special measures were taken to protect the mountings from extreme weather. The Sd.Kfz 268 was instead the ground-to-air liason officer's armored vehicle and had different radio set (Fu 7): its job was communicating with Luftwaffe's air units in order to get cooperation to carry on actions on the battlefield: the numbers of these armored vehicles (Sd. Kfz. 268) was very small as Luftwaffe was at the time under-strength and in duty of defending the Reich.

Bergepanther

When the heavy Tigers appeared, German typical recovery units were unable to carry on their job because their equipments (Famo halftracks, 20 metric tons flatbeds and other light halftracks) were unable to deal with the heavy weight. Up to the Russian campaign, Germans had always had the control of the battlefields and so were able to perform good in this job. Now, in the heavy conditions of the war, not only they could not practically recover the heavy (and valuable) tanks but also that lack of armor made direct recovery impossible. Once again the Panther chassis was to be utilized as a conversion of recovery vehicles but as MAN (the main Panther manufacturer) was overloaded in trying to copy with the orders for a big number of Panthers ready for action, the Bergepanther program was delayed up to early june 1943 when 12 turretless Panthers (that is, no expecial modification) were delivered to the Army. From July to October 1943 other 70 units were sent.

Bergepanthers were provided with 40 metric tons winch (driven by the turret traverse system) in the lower superstructure and which with a pulley could double their capability (80 metric tons). A spade was added on the rear to block the berge when attempting to drag a vehicle and two square plates were added to the front to maintain a wooden beam when pushing disabled vehicles. In addition, 2-tons crane was added for performing interventions such replacing the engine or transmission. An additional mount for 20mm KwK 38 gun was sometimes added to the front plate but rarely used. Production ended with about 350 beergepahters of all types produced. To finally stae the usefulness of this Panther variant, let a veteran rember:

"The change from my old Famo to the Bergepanther was incredible. We could always help, even under enemy fire. I can recall a situation when a cormade was hit by 7.62 cm fire during recovery. The shell bounced off the front plate and the vehicle still rescued a disabled Panther. There were no casualties ... on the other hand, we had severe problems with the final drives. We carried spare parts for the transmission wherever was free space".

The early Jagdpanthers were simply Ausf. D stripped down of the turret. Here a Bergepanther Ausf. D tows a broken down Ferdinand, Orel sector, July 1943

Jagdpanther

One of the most important (and perhaps the most interesting) conversion was the Jagdpanther tank destroyer, armed with the 88mm L71,2 PaK 43/3 capable of piercing a 226mm plate at 30 degrees on a 450 metres range, placed in low, highly sloped super-structure. Initially a 150 Jagdpanther for month production was planned but Allies' bombings permitted only a total production of only 382 tank destroyers, too few to have a significative impact on the war.

The Panzerjaeger Panther (Sd.Kfz. 173), then renamed by Hitler himself as 'Jagdpanther', was also equipped with a MG in the right front hull to prevent a disaster similar to that happened at Kursk with the Ferdinands heavy tank destroyers. Its PaK 43 gun could swing horizontally between +11 to -11 degrees and vertically between +8 and -14 degrees. Its crew was six: commander, gunner, driver and two loaders. They were issued only to expecially formed schwere Panzer Jaeger Abteilungen (heavy tank destroyer battalions) of both Heer and Waffen-SS, under OKH orders, but in late war some of them equipped the panzer abteilungen (tank battalions) as tank replacements. The limited traverse gun did not them suitable for the role but lack of tanks forced the Germans to throw in the battle everything they had at the hand.

Late model Jagdpanther: on 30th July 1944 three of these tanks, beloging to the s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 654 destroyed more than half of a Churchill tanks squadron in a little more than a minute.

Only 5,508 Panther of all types were built: while their costruction was expensive and unusefully complex (but in the same time and with same number of men it was possible to build two Panthers or one Tiger), Panther provided the Panzertruppen with an excellent mix of armor protection, fire power and mobility and its only defect was the unsufficient production. The efforts for production of a new Ausf. F, with stronger armor and a new schmallturm turret, also failed to go over the prototype stage.

All plans to make the German industries able to manufacture 400 tanks for month felt under the Allies bombings; despite of this 132 Ausf. Gs were built monthly until February 1945. Although less known than Tiger, Panther was along with the Panzer IV, the true mainstay of the Panzertruppen: the poor performance of many of the later crews was because they were mainly untrained and lacked battle experience. In the hands of veteran crews it could pay every foe hard. Albert Speer remembers about the political decision to give priority to new units:

[...] Many commanders of fighting units begged me to modernize their over-aging equipment, replacing it with the weapons that our still elevated production could provide at that time.

But Hitler, and with him Himmler, thought that, nevertheless all the counter-demonstrations, withdrawing units had no more moral strength for continuing to resist. So the best measure was, for them, creating with maximum speed new units, the so-called Volksgrenadierdivisionen. About the other older divisions, they could be left to bleed. [...]

As this system could be translated in facts I saw at the end of September 1944, when I visited a recently formed detachment of a new armored division, located near Bitburg. The commander, an officier who had given good proof of his capabilities during many years of war, accompanied me to see the battlefield where some days before it was consumed the tragedy of just formed and still inexepert panzerbrigade.

The unsufficient training did the unit to lose ten of its thirty-two newest Panthers during the nearing march. The commander showed me as the remnants twenty-two tanks were launched on uncovered terrain without adeguate instructions, so that fifteen tanks were fired at and destroyed by an American AT battalion, as self-moving shapes in a targeting polygon.

"It was the first combat for the just trained unit. What I could have done with these Panthers and my old tankers!", the commander told me.

Panther turrets as pill-boxes

During the Italian campaign the Germans mounted Panther's turrets on concrete pillboxes for anti-tank defence. Some were installed for saving the vehicles while providing a cheap but powerful anti-tank capability, but the most were expecially designed ones with increased 40 mm roof armor to whithstand heavy artillery shells, and heavier 70mm side armor. Most of the Italian inland was mountanous: by blocking a few passes with assault guns and anti-tank pill-boxes (as the Panther's one) the Germans were able to contain the menace with their thinily spread forces. Although the majority of this Panther Ostwallturm saw employement in the East, in the effort of building strong German defensive positions along along a line going from Narva to Crimea. As war progressed many German cities were named felde platze (fortress) and turrets (both appositely designed ones or from damaged tanks) were used to strengthen these improvised positions.

The turrets, with their low profile, resulted quite impressive to Allies commands and an evaluation of the Panther turrets employed as pill-boxes by the British Mediterranean theatre high command (circa August 1944) expressed in these terms (extract from T. Jentz's Panther variants):

Panther turrets are not of course AFV but their impact on the course of AFV affairs is thought to be sufficiently important to justify a few words. Panther turrets were first met in the Hitler line and were in fact the salient features round which the other defences were built up. They are actual tank turrets, though perhaps of a lightly earlier vintage than those now on tanks. They are mounted on a turret ring fitted on an armoured box, built up of welded plate about 63mm (2.5 inches) in thickness. The whole of this box is sunk into the ground and earth is banked up close to the turret so that it is first cleared by the gun at depression and yet offers some additional protection to the base of the turret skirts.

Traverse is by hand only and no power is supplied. Access to the turret is either by access doors in the turret itself or from underneath the armoured box by means of a steel ladder communicating with a deep dugout. It is obvious that the crews live in the turret and dugout permanently, as electric light is supplied and there are other signs of continuing operation.

Panther Ausf. D turrets used as anti-tank pillboxes. This one was placed nearCelle di Rimini, on the Gothic Line.

This system of static defence was backed up by SP equipment and ordering anti-tank guns. In front of each position there was a graveyard of Churchills and some Shermans; perhaps eight tanks to a gun and all within 200 metres of it. This is, at present, the cost of reducing a Panther turret and it would see to be an excellent investment for Hitler. Obviously these turrets are most formidable unless each one is dealt with by a carefully prepared and co-ordinated attack.

The turrets are almost invisible till they fire and, when located, there is very little to shoot at and, unless the turret happens to be pointing elsewhere, it will not be penetrated either by 75mm or 6 pounder guns. HE fire is obviously useless. In all cases where there was enough of the turret left to diagnose the method of destruction, penetration of the turret side had been effected. One Churchill crew who destroyed one with their 6 pounder say that the turret blew up immediately it was hit. This was presumably due to the ammunition, since a large quantity is stored. If anti-tank defence is to consist of these turrets in the future it cannot but emphasise the need for a proportion of tanks to carry a really effective AP weapon, though it is not by any means accepted that attack by tanks is the best and correct method of dealing with them.


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