PzKpfw VI Ausf. H/E Tiger

Tiger I Ausf. E (1943-44)

Weigth 57 tons Crew 5 Weapons 88mm L56 KwK 36 gun with 92 rounds, 2 7,92mm MG 34 with 5700 rounds Armor hull 26-100mm (nose 100mm, sloped plate 60mm, sides 60-80mm, rear 80mm, top and bottom 26mm); turret 26-110mm (gun shield 110m, front 110mm, sides and rear 80mm, top 26mm) Engine 694hp gasoline Maybach HL 230 P45, 12-cylinders on V, liquid cooled Speed 37Km/h Autonomy 100Km Length (max) 8,46m Width 3,73m (battle tracks); 3,15m (transport tracks) Height 2,90m

Advantages: heavy armor protection, heavy fire power (thanks to the mighty 88mm) on vast ranges

Disadvantages: great weigth overloaded the trasmission system and caused many mechanical faults; lack of fast mobility due to great weight and high fuel consumption

The need for an heavy tank ...

The soviet tanks (T-34 and KV) were far superior to any model the Panzertruppen could oppose them. Request was emitted for a tank with a maximum weight of 45 tons. The pre-war projects were ordered to be resumed and upgraded for a heavy tank design that would carry the mighty 88mm L56 KwK36 gun, heavy armor and a speed of at least 40 Km/h. Krupp firm was charged of designing the turret, which was closely projected for Dr. Porsche chassis.

Porsche was so sure of the success of his advanced 'Tiger' that production of the vehicle already started before the government trials: but while his electrically-driven, rear-sprocketed drive and forward mounted turret design was surely advanced it was also too much unreliable. Heschel prototype was much more conventional with a centrally mounted turret to minimize the length of the overlapping gun, gasoline engine and forward sprockets. On 20th April 1942 Porsche and Henchel show their prototypes to the Fuehrer and, after ground trials, the Henschel VK4501(H) was chosen for the serial production because it was more compatible with the existing manufacturing facilitiers and had susperior performances.

Tiger I Ausf. H armor scheme (Photo by Valera Potapov)

Building of Porsche type VK 45.01(P) was limited to an order of 90 tanks to equip two heavy tank battalion for Africa because of the air-cooling of the engines. Failure of the Porsche's diesel engines cancelled the program and the chassis were finally converted in schwere PanzerJaeger Ferdinand in 1943. Dr. Porsche also saw his 'Tiger' name being assigned to the Henschel tank which, with a 100mm front armor capable of repulsing any projectile fired from known guns, was seen by the OKW as the weapon capable of giving the German panzertruppen the superiority over any known Russian tank and future successors.

The 8.8 cm KwK 36 tank gun

The KwK 36 was an excellent gun which was able, coupled with the advanced optics aiming devices, of first shot hits at ranges exceeding 1,000 meters. The weapon was directly derived from the 88 mm FlaK (AA) 36 gun, which had proved its effectiveness from long distances against the heaviest Allies tanks in any theatres. Krupp designed both gun and turrets for being fitted on Porsche prototype but with a few modification they could fit in the Henschel one.

The turret was shaped with a continued curved to horse shoe-like rolled plate with a 100 mm thick gun mantlet with a hatch for the MG and two other for the binocular aiming sight. When the aiming device was replaced by a monocular version the rightmost hatch was plugged in the early models while late ones had it no more. Over the optical device the gunner was provided of handling gears for aiming the gun on both vertical and horizontal axis.

The turret was engine-driven and was capable to traverse at maximum speed of 360 degrees in 60 seconds. If no energy was supplied the hand gear had to be moved 720 times to archieve the all-around turn. The slow traverse of Tiger's turret was one of its greatest disadvantage in close combats: the slow turning was infact provided for accurate aiming at long ranges (where the Tiger was thought to engage). Many tankers reduced this slow feature by developing a manouvre already suited by assault guns tankers: the driver turned the tank in target's direction while the gunner was also turning the turret. Of course, this required great coordination among the crew members.

Hunting the Red bear

Albert Speer (Reichsminister for the Weapons and Munitions production) wrote about the Tiger's first appearance in his memories:

Early model Tiger I, belonging to sPzAbt 501, in Tunisia. The Feifel air filter are visible to the sides of the rear plates.

After the miserable debut of the new German Tiger tanks on August 29th 1942, the German High Command decided to test them again under different conditions. This time the Tigers were coming to the aid of the 96th Infantry Division's men, who were trapped in the bitter cold of the Russian Winter. After this battle the full potential of the new tank would be realized. Plans to build an Ausf. H2 armed with same Panther 75mm gun (in a turret designed ad-hoc by Rheinmetall) were dropped because of field successes and production needs.

The schwere Panzer Abteilungen

The original order dated 26 May 1941 was for an heavy panzer which had to equip special breaktrough detachments of 20 panzers for every Panzerdivision. Light tanks were added for performing duties such scouting and messenger escort for which the heavy tanks were not suited. Things went in other ways with the order dated 15 August 1942 so that the first five heavy panzer battalions (501-505) and four organic companies (Grossdeautschland and 1st, 2nd and 3rd SS) each had a company organization of nine Tiger and ten PzKpfw III Ausf. N.

After action reports on March 3rd 1943 it was officially given the company organization of 14 heavy tanks. Light armored (and not) vehicles were added to perform support missions as unit commanders argued about this. By the end of June 1943 all previous units had their organization updated. After Stalingrad the German Panzerwaffe decaying state was energeticly opposed by the recalled Heinz Guderian whcih dictated new guidelines for the Tigers as well for all others types of armored units (Panzerjaegers, Panthers, assault guns, SP-artillery, etc.).

A major operation in which the Tigers were employed was in the German counter-attack to retake Kharkov and crush the Soviet winter offensive. The success made Hitler himself to say that "a Tiger battalion is well worth of a Panzerdivision". It was one of the motivation which led the Germans to delay the attack for cutting the Kursk salient.

Kursk

Following months were spent trying to group as many Tigers as possible for the Operation Zitadelle. Two s.Pz.Abt. were sent in the East, 505 (except the 3rd comapny which followed on July 9th) in the Orel sector and 503 in the Kharkov-Bielgorod front. Other four heavy companies (14 tanks each) were assigned to each of the three divisions of the II SS-Panzerkorps and to Heers Gross Deautschland Panzergrenadierdivision. The s.Pz.Abt. 503 was not used as a single unit and saw instead each of its companies being assigned to the 19th, 7th and 6th Panzerdivisions of the III Panzerkorps (Armee Abteilung Kempf).

On July 5th Kursk begun. On a double front of 300 Km the Wehrmacht launched its attacks with the 9th Army from the North and 4th Panzerarmee and the Armee abteilung Kempf from South and South-East. The Tigers were awaiting. From the first day the 9th Army infantry was bombed by heavy artillery barrages and counterattacked by Soviet infantry and tanks. Between assaults and counter-assaults much time was spent in overwhelming the first line of the defenders.

The intervention of Tigers and Ferdinands had been vital. A breech was finally archieved and the Panzers pushed forward, but resistance stiffened. Adcance was so slow that minefields were placed on the easy-to-foresee German attacks' directions. Russian infantry fought hard and artillery succesfully divided the Panzers from the following infantry. Without it the Ferdinands, which succesfully breeched the enemy lines, were being knocked out with flamethrowers and magnetic mines. Well camouflaged anti-tank gun nests ambushed the panzers. T-34 mass counter-attacked continously.

The panzers and panzerjagers took an heavy toll of them but the infantry could not follow because of the heavy losses and the German drive towards South was finally halted. All others attempts till 11 July took only minor gains to the Germans. On July 12th the Soviets launched their own attack towards the 2nd Panzerarmee which was meant to protect the flank of the 9th Armee. General Model, commander of the 9th Armee, stopped any offensive and recalled forces to front this menace. Any remanining German hopes for victory was in the Southern echelon.

Early model Tiger I, belonging Das Reich SS-Panzerdivision setting up position prior to Zitadelle, Bielgorod sector, July 1943

Manstein's armies struck on July 4th. The 4th Panzerarmee, with the II SS-Panzerkorps and the XXXXVIII Panzerkops (with Gross Deautschland division), headed straight North while the Armee abteilung Kempf provided protection on the Eastern flank and directed itself towards North-East. Both Soviets and Germans had concentrated on the Southern flank of the salient their major armored forces. At the first time the Germans found only mine-field and heavy artillery bombardments, without any major armor commitments by the Russians. The SS-Panzerschuetze Walter Lau, loader in one of the heavy tanks of the Leibstandarte company, said about the first days of the attack:

The following battles took Tigers and their crews to the honors. The SS-Unterscharfuhrer Franz Staudegger was one of them, destroying 22 Russian tanks in single day's clash. The SS journal, Das Schwarze Korps, so described his exploit.

Tigers at Kursk, July 1943

In their fiercely opposed advance panzers, and among them the Tigers, arrived to the critical point of the battle. On 12th July they assaulted Prokhorovka and breaktrough what they thought to be the last Soviet defence. The Waffen-SS of the II Panzerkorps attacked from South-West and the III Pz. Korps from South and South-East. Although the Tigers were very few in numbers (the SS korps had only 15 operational at that time) their presence was fearable. The Russians had already tasted the power of the 88s and were decided to use any mean to devoid the German tanks (not only the Tigers but also the latest Pz IVs and StuG/Panzerjaegers) of their firepower advantage.

The 5th Guards Tank Army takes its positions in the in the sector with more than 500 T-34s on a total force of 850. Armor reseves were committed and others were ready to intervene. The German deployment was (relatively) not less important, about 500 tanks and assault guns. Both opponents knew about the importance of the upcoming fights. Soviets started barraging German assembly zones with aritllery fire and Sturmovik air strikes in early morning. The Luftwaffe fighters joined the battle, and the battle lit in the air, where each side wanted to give its contribution to the operations. On the mid of the morning the Germans started advancing.

Anti-tank defences opened fire. Soviet tanks charged the Germans and were heavily damaged by the Panzers: they tried to reduce the disadvantage in long fire range by using the irregular ground to come closer to the Germans. But these charges had an heavy price: their massed formations were decimated, some entirely destroyed by the superior firepower of the opponents. But the heavy tanks were so frustrated in their armor and gun power by the close distance fight where the slow turret's turning time was a big disadvantage. Desperately coureageous Soviet tankers arrived to ram their own tanks against the Tigers. Losses were heavy for both sides: Russians' were much higher but could be replaced. Prokhorovka was tactical German success but a strategic success of the Red Army which halted the thrust. On the sunset of the 13 July both armies set on defensive positions.

On July 10th the Allies landed in Sicily. Hitler called off Zitadelle the day after the battle despite Manstein's whishes to proceed at least until destroying the two Soviet tank armies in the area by commiting German reserves. But decision was made. Although, Soviet tankers were shocked by seeing their 76mm rounds bouncing off Tiger's armor: so impressive became the Tiger to the Russians that the Pravda proclaimed immediately after Prokhovka: "The Tigers are burning!". At Kursk there was the most massive assemble of Tigers of the War, 146 tanks in all: of these 33 were lost by August 1943.

Deisigned as an offensive weapon, as the Germans went to strategic defence, the Tiger demonstrated the usefulness of its heavy firepower and excellet sights in defensive combat. For all the Summer and Autumn 1943 Tiger units fought trying to steam the red tide and gain the time need to establish a strong German defensive line just upon the weastern eadge of Dnepr reiver. The Soviet knew it and made all the possible to prevent it: Russian troops established several bridgeheads and the Germans failed in destroying them. In November the Russians re-took Kiev and pushed westward. Panzer reinforcements were recalled form the West and, along the newly trained infantry regiments from Germany, were sent to Von Manstein to prevent the disaster. Faithfull to his convinctions, he counter-attacked the Russians at Zhitomir and Korosten but the mud stopped any further movement and major successes: despite Soviet armor had been severly mauled in the battles they were able to maintain their gains.

Late model Tiger I with steel rimmed road wheels beonging to the s.Pz.Abt. 505 in Russia, April 1944. These new resilient steel roadwheels were better suited to sustain the heavy weight of the vehicles, saved rubber and avoided the accumulation of mud threathening to throw off or jam the track.

After a short pause because of the German counter-offensive, in February 1944, the Russians re-took the initiative and encircled a German Army korps in area of Kamenec and by early March the entire 1st Panzerarmee was encircled in the Kamenec-Podolski region as well. Among them there were several SS units such as the Wiking in Cerkassy and the Leibstandarte with a Das Reich's kampfgruppe in Kamenec. A second time, from Stalingrad, Hitler's stand fast orders had took to an encirclement of a major German force.

The men trapped in the famous Korsun pocket resisted until April 1944 to continous assaults, when a rescue mission, spearheaded by Kampfgruppe Becker, a mixed armored group with Tigers from the s.Pz.Abt. 505 along with Panthers from the II SS-Panzerkorps, created a corridor permitting to several tens of thousands men to escape. But the heavy weapons had to be abandoned. As Becker said, the Tigers performed better then Panthers against Soviet armor during the operation.

But it was in defensive actions that the Tiger show its full power: moving from a camouflaged position to another and flanked by a small group of other tanks or infantry the Tiger was able to front a huge enemy force: Wittman's engagement in Villers-Bocage is the most known example of this type of actions.

A Tiger against an entire brigade (Extract from Paul Carell's Sie Kommen)

On June 13th 1944 Montgomery assaulted the the small town of Tilly and Lingevres, strongpoints of the Panzer Lehr division to force Gen. Bayerlein to committ his tank reserves. In the meanwhile a combat group from British 7th Armored Division, the Desert Rats, was moving along the German front's flank, reaching the village of Villers-Bocage.

To discover this advance was the Obersturmfuhrer (SS-Leutnant) Michael Wittmann onboard a Tiger tank belonging to the 2nd Kompanie, s.SS.Pz.Abt. 501. Wittmann was company commander and excellent officer. On the Eastern front he was an experimented tanker and had destroyed one hundred-nineteen (119) enemy tanks and about the same number of guns. He was insignited with the Cross of Knight with Oakleaves and an hero for the German people.

The strong Tiger units had left the zone of Beauvais on June 7th and moving through Paris was directed towards the invasion front. On the mording of 8 June, near Versailles, the 2nd company was spotted by fighter-bombers and gravely bombed. From then it has continued its march only by night, arriving on June 12th in sight of Villers-Bocage. For the morning of 13th a service of repairing to the machines which had much suffered for the long march was ordered .

Obersturmfuhrer Wittmann with his chosen gunner, Marschall Woll, went to recognize the ground. Exiting from a little wood he saw advancing enemy tanks on the other side of the road for Quote 213, North of Villers-Bocage. Wittmann prudently retreated to the wood's margins. He watched. He counted. It was not a scout team but a full-strength combat group which was advancing proper in the rearways of the Panzer Lehr division. He quickly decided to go for an immediate counter-action.

The Tank column traversed the town. It was, but Wittman did not know it yet, the spearhead of the British 7th Armored division and more precisely the 22nd brigade with some infantry from the 1st brigade. Along with them there also were detachments of the 8th Hussars regiment, the 1st tank regiment and the 5th artillery battalion. Wittmann saw with his binoculars that no resistance had been opposed in Villers-Bocage against the Tommies. Reserve units had already been overwhelmed the day before.

The British bulk marched on the main road, towards Quote 213, in Caen's direction. The wheather was foggy, no fighter nor recon plane was in the air. Despite this the British are of a surprisingly carelessness. A motorized infantry company took a pause on the road. It was Company A of the 1st Fusiliers brigade. "Are they thinking they have won the war?" said Wittmann's gunner. "Evidently, but they will uncover to be wrong". Then he shouted his orders. The morning quiete is broken by a thunder. The 88 gun had opened fire.

The British lead tank, only 80 m distant, immediately went in flames. The Tiger rushed as a giant out of the woods and headed for the road. It headed towards the enemy column at very high speed. It stopped once again. It fired. It re-started. Wittmann covered the flank of the British brigade and struck every vehicle one by one. Tanks, trucks, armored transporters which had wedged themselves. Their march was obstructed by the first vehicles hit and flaming. In tail the half-tracks were too much close. Excellent target for Wittmann's gun and machine-guns.

All of the half-tracked vehicles and a dozen of tanks from the regimental command and the scout company were reduced to wreckage. A Cromwell tank did its turret to rotate. The 75mm grenade hit the German in its side but made no damage.The gun of the Tiger blowned up the Cromwell.

Now also on Quote 213 there were warsounds. They were the four Wittmann's Tigers remained in reserve which were firing on the scout tanks of the 8th Hussars. In the meanwhile the combat had alerted the 1st Tiger company. The Hauptsturmfuhrer (SS-Captain) Moebius left with eight tanks ready. He encircled the village, entered in it with Wittmann's tanks and destroyed the remaining Cromwells.

Vainly the British Major French tried to avoid the disaster with his anti-tank guns. One of them was still firing in a small side way. A Tiger entered in, knocking against a side building which, crumbling, covered the gun. The Tiger rocked away the ruins, then it retreated and returned on the main road. The gun of Major French was able to score only once. The round broke the track, immobilizing the tank. Wittmann ordered "Out!" and leaded his men for his company.

In the town Moebius' tanks were fighting all-around against the British infantry. The Tommies fought desperately. From windows, cellars and house doors they fired with their anti-tank weapons (PIATs) similar to the German Panzerfausts. Two of the Tigers were hit and took fire. None of the crews survived. The others continued to fight and finally the surviving British surrendered the town and pulled out. A handful of Tigers won the battle.

Wittmann was decorated with swords and diamonds for his Cross of Knigh and promoted Hauptsturmfuhrer. The Desert Rats, after this defeat, were no more employed in a major action in the Normandy's battle. The situation presented before is a dramatization of not a less spectacular event, described by Oberssturmfuhrer Wittmann in his after-action report:

This Tiger crewmen are performing the change between battle and narrower transport tracks: the track is fastened to the cable which is dragged by the running wheel upon the rolling train.

Mid and late model Tigers went under several technical improvements and parts form the starting Tiger II project such as a new cast commander's cupola, more powerful engines with more extended cooling and use of Tiger II's steel-rimmed roadwheels. This last change solved many problems with mud accumulation between the previous interleaved wheels which often thrown the track off. One of the most concerning thing about the Tigers was their great weight which proved to be a major drawback when recovery of disabled tanks was needed. The German Army, infact, had no vehicle able to tow heavy tank. As improvisation three 18 t heavy halftracks (but there some reports of five having been employed) had to be used to recovery a single tank but this method also proved very inefficient. Up to late 1943, with the arrival of the Bergepanther, based upon the Panther's chassis, no vehicle was efficient enough to carry on, with reasonable battle conditions, the job.

While Tigers were excellent heavy tanks very likely suitable for attacks, the Tiger's s.Pz.Abt. were employed as defensive 'fire brigades' to prevent breaktrough by Soviet massed armored formation. Because of their small numbers, the heavy tanks battalions had to be moved along the entire front line to assist stopping the Russians. These movements were carried by railway. As the Germans lacked of suitable heavy recovery vehicles, it lacked also rail-wagons able to support the heavy weight: once more an ad-hoc design was needed and the Reichbahn (German railing) designed a heavy rail wagon capable to carry up to 82 tons vehicles. It resulted useful also for transporting Ferdinands/Elefants, Tiger IIs and Jagdtigers.

Also with these special wagons the Tiger had to be fitted with narrower 'transport' tracks. The operation of unmounting the wider 'battle tracks', while being complex and possibly being obstructed by external conditions such as bad weather, could be carried, by an expert crew, in about thirty minutes. In April 1944 Tiger production reached its most with 105 tanks produced, then the monthly total steadly decreased because of the Tiger II taking its place in the assembly halls. By August 1944 it was out of production when 1,354 had been built, leaving the assembly lines and the heavy tank role to the more modernly designed Koenigstiger. Few of them still fought during the last stand of the Reich, Berlin.

Sturmmorser Tiger

After Stalingrad the Germans needed a heavly armored vehicle for street fighting and so the Tiger chassis was selected for the conversion. First request were for carrying the heavy 305mm field howitzer but since it was not at disposal an other weapon, designed for Kriegmarine's anti-submarine warfare, was selected. Over the hull a 150mm thick super-structure was raised and a 380mm Raketenwerfer 61 with 12 rounds was placed. Due to the war situation only 19 were built from August 1944 by using battle damaged Tigers and went to equip two companies: employed singularly on the battlefield these 68 tons monsters with an incredible 10 litres for 1,600 metres fuel consumption could not take any appreciable advantage to the retreating German armies which needed well other in those times.

Their first action was during the Warsaw uprising in late Summer 1944 where they were used for the job they had been designed to perform. Another company was put in action on the Western front were they were all captured out of three which continued to fight in the defence of Bonn, before retreating and being destroyed because of lack of ammunition and fuel.

Sturmtiger (Photo by Herr Oberst)