|
3rd Division
On 23 April, the 3rd Division under command of Major-General Savige
assumed control in the Wau-Bulolo area and Kanga Force ceased to exist.
Savige's force originally included only the 17th Brigade and three
Independent Companies (2/3rd, 2/5th and 2/7th). Savige was instructed to
turn the area into an active operational zone for mobile defence. It was
estimated that there were 5,500 Japanese around Lae and Salamaua with
between 6,000 and 8,000 at Madang and from 9,000 to 11,000 at Wewak.
Savige, who was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, decided to
establish firm bases as far forward as possible and to harass the enemy
with patrols. However, only small forces could be maintained in the
forward area and no useful military purpose was served by attacks and
raids which were not properly organised, supported by superior fire and
fully driven home.
The Japanese were dug in on the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation
Hill along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On 24 April a company of the
2/7th attacked the Pimple and Green Hill, Four aircraft strafed the
Japanese position and then the company advanced in two columns supported
by mortar fire, but the enemy were firmly entrenched on the precipitous
feature and the Australians were halted. Next day another attack,
supported by aircraft and the 1st Mountain Battery, limited to fifty
rounds a gun, also failed. On 7 May a company attack was again launched
against the Pimple but again it failed. On 9 May the Japanese themselves
attacked in the Pimple area and surrounded the forward Australian
company, which was not relieved until the afternoon of the 11th, by
which time it had withstood eight attacks by parts of two Japanese
battalions.
The 2/3rd Independent Company had been probing deeply and seeing that
the Japanese were only lightly holding Bobdubi Ridge obtained permission
to attack it. On 3 and 4 May the Japanese were pushed off part of
Bobdubi Ridge and in the following days drove back Japanese moving up to
retake it. From Bobdubi, the 2/3rd Independent Company was able to
severely harass the Japanese with raids and ambushes. So successful were
the 2/3rd Independent Company's tactics that Savige felt constrained to
warn them not to attempt too much; `premature commitments in the
Salamaua area could not be backed at present by an adequate force', he
signalled. The pressure was kept up round Bobdubi and on 11 May a patrol
found the ridge to be abandoned, quickly occupied it, and exchanged fire
with the enemy on Komiatum Ridge on which the main track travelled. The
Japanese reacted strongly to this threat to their communications,
launching a full-scale attack supported by guns and mortars on the 14th
and forced the Australians to withdraw. On 15 May, over 100 Japanese
aircraft attacked the Australian positions in three heavy raids. The
Japanese maintained their air attacks in the following days, but
generally against targets farther to the Australian rear. On 17 and 18
May large formations of Japanese aircraft raided Wau airfield.
In late May, the 2/6th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and the
15th Brigade headquarters and another battalion of that brigade began to
arrive in Savige's area. During May Australian Beaufighters and Bostons
with American Mitchells attacked Madang and Lae, maintaining steady
pressure on these bases. The RAAF now had three squadrons tied more or
less to the Salamaua operations with four squadrons based on Milne Bay
and engaged chiefly in attacks on shipping and in reconnaissance. Two
Catalina flying boat squadrons based on Cairns also played a part in the
operations in New Guinea by dropping mines in the enemy's harbours,
making night raids and supporting coast-watchers in enemy-held
territory.
Instructions were issued for an advanced base on the coast to be
seized within sixty miles of Lae, this being the farthest distance
landing craft could carry troops in one night. Nassau Bay was chosen and
its occupation would enable the force round Mubo to be at least partly
supplied by sea. In addition to the bay, the high ground around Goodview
Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridge running thence to the sea were to
be seized. The focus of the operations towards Salamaua were to draw the
Japanese away from Lae and Salamaua was not to be assaulted until after
the Lae operation. Until the Lae offensive commenced, the Japanese were
to be led to believe that Salamaua was the main objective.
On 19 and 20 June there were signs that the enemy was about to
anticipate the allied attack. They were patrolling aggressively; during
the 20th enemy aircraft made more than eighty bombing sorties against
the Australian positions. The right forward company of the 2/6th,
holding its wide area towards Nassau Bay, was under sharp fire on the
afternoon of the 20th. Next morning an attack in strength was dispersed;
in the afternoon a stronger attack was made and soon the Australians
were closely engaged. A fresh company reinforced the one under attack.
At nightfall the Japanese withdrew having lost an estimated 100 men, but
they renewed the attack on the 22nd and 23rd, when the beleaguered
troops were heartened by the sight of Beaufighters strafing along the
track. That afternoon the Japanese attacks ceased. The 150 Australians
on Lababia Ridge lost eleven were killed and twelve wounded. The had
been attacked by two Japanese battalions, 1,500 troops, who lost
forty-one killed and 131 wounded.
Nassau Bay
The 162nd US Regiment landed at Nassau Bay on the night of the 29/30
June and next morning moved out of the bridgehead. On 1 July the
easternmost company of the 2/6th Battalion advanced to the coast along
the south arm of the Bitoi driving off a company of Japanese. On the
morning of the third day ashore, 2 July, the main American force
remained clustered round the beach, but that afternoon one company
advanced to the Bitoi. Next day four 75-mm guns were landed at Nassau, a
most important reinforcement, and by the 4th more than 1,400 troops were
ashore. Papuan soldiers advancing along the coast ahead of the 162nd US
Regiment reached Lake Salus on 9 July and then pushed on to Tambu Bay.
On the morning of 7 July the 2/6th had attacked Observation Hill and
by nightfall held most of it. Next day the leading Australian company
advanced a stage farther towards a creek where it was to link with the
Americans from the Bitoi. On the 9th, now supported by the American
field guns whereas formerly there had been only two mountain guns behind
them, five Australian companies pressed on with aggressive patrols
until, on the 10th, only seventy-five Japanese survived in the area, and
their line of retreat was cut. On the 12 May the Pimple was occupied. On
13 May there was a general advance and on 14 May Mubo airfield and Green
Hill were taken. The Japanese still stoutly defended Old Vickers where
they were strongly dug in to defend the track to Salamaua and on 7 and 9
July stopped attacks by the 58th/59th Battalion.
The US III/162nd Battalion (Major Archibald B Roosevelt) was
assembled at Nassau Bay by 12 July as a preliminary move to establish
artillery at Tambu Bay. On the 21st the American battalion reached Tambu
Bay and supplies were being unloaded there. The Americans' task was to
capture Scout Ridge, overlooking the bay. Attacks on the 22nd failed and
a second battalion (the US II/162nd) was sent into reinforce the attack.
On 16 July a company of the 2/5th Battalion had assaulted Mount Tambu
with great dash and captured all but the main northern knoll. The
Japanese counter-attacked again and again that night, supported by
mortar bombs and shells from a mountain gun. A second company reached
the area next morning. On the night of the 18 May the Japanese attacked
and almost encircled the two Australian companies on Tambu, and next day
a fierce struggle developed. By 2.30 pm, after much slaughter of the
Japanese, they accepted defeat and left the Australians in possession of
the southern slopes. Farther north, on 15 July, after mortar and
Vickers-gun fire, two platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company attacked
Ambush Knoll south of Namling, while the 58th/59th Battalion attacked
towards Bobdubi in another effort to cut the Japanese communications.
One platoon of the Independent Company drove the Japanese from their
forward positions, the other thrust them from Orodubi, and that night
the Japanese abandoned Ambush Knoll. The attack by the 58th/59th was
upset, however, by Japanese counter-moves. In a renewed attack on the
17th the Independent Company again carried out its task but the
58th/59th was held up.
The establishment of the Nassau Bay base had made it possible to
bring in and supply a substantial quantity of artillery. By 23 May two
US field artillery battalions, two Australian field batteries, the 1st
Australian Mountain Battery, the 2/6th Australian Survey Battery, and
four anti-aircraft batteries were in place. On the right flank the
American regiment was still making little progress. In the fourth week
of July the US II/162nd battalion completed its arrival at Tambu Bay and
was given the task of capturing 'Roosevelt Ridge' as it was now named.
The battalion attacked and gained and held a foothold on the ridge. The
Japanese were well dug in and not to be driven out by frontal attacks.
Roosevelt's battalion, aided by Papuan patrols, was now employed cutting
the enemy's supply route to the west.
On 28 July a flanking attack by a company of the 2/6th took a feature
forward of Ambush Knoll. The same day 58th/59th Battalion supported by
artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire at last took the stubborn Old
Vickers position and drove the Japanese from Bobdubi Ridge. It was
estimated that in the six weeks to 6 August, the 15th Brigade had killed
400 Japanese for a loss of forty-six killed and 152 wounded, an
indication of the increasing tactical superiority of the attackers.
The leading battalion of the 29th Australian Brigade, the 42nd, was
moved forward into the Nassau Bay area and thence marched northward and
at length went into position between the Americans on the right and the
17th Brigade, of which it became part. As
a preliminary to the capture of Mount Tambu the 42nd Battalion occupied
Davidson Ridge between Tambu and Roosevelt Ridge.
Then on 13/14 August the II/162nd Battalion took Roosevelt Ridge after a
heavy artillery barrage which bared it of vegetation. The 15th Brigade's
attack opened on 14 August. Twenty-nine heavy bombers accurately bombed
Coconut Ridge with devastating effect, and guns, mortars and
machine-guns brought down a barrage. A company of the 2/7th Battalion
then attacked up a cliff so steep that the men had to crawl on hands and
knees, but by early in the afternoon they had gained the North Coconuts
position. On the night of the 16/17 August the Japanese abandoned South
Coconuts.
The 2/6th Battalion opened its attack on Komiatum Ridge on 16 August.
After about 500 shells had been fired into the Japanese positions two
companies attacked and in twenty-five minutes had occupied the
objective. The enemy in the Mount Tambu area were now surrounded, their
routes to the north being cut on Komiatum and Davidson Ridges. It was
expected that lack of rations (patrols had discovered they were
delivered every three days) would cause the Japanese to attempt the
break out on the third night. On 19 August patrols of the 2/5th found
Goodview Junction deserted and US I/162nd Battalion occupied Tambu
without opposition.
The 15th Brigade now pressed in towards the track leading to
Salamaua. On 17 August after a bombardment two platoons of the 2/3rd
Independent Company advanced; one occupied the junction of the
Bobdubi-Salamaua track and another track from the south without
opposition, but the other was held. Heavy fighting developed, the
Japanese launching strong counter-attacks. On 19 August Savige ordered
that every effort must be made to close the enemy's avenues of escape
between Komiatum and Bobdubi Ridges. Next day the brigade attacked on a
wide front, and the 58th/59th succeeded in cutting the Komiatum track in
several places.
In preparation for the new offensive, Savige was instructed that his
force should be so organised that by 28 August it could be maintained
from the sea without air supply. From 21 August the 29th Brigade began
to relieve the 17th Brigade (excluding the 2/7th Battalion attached to
the 15th Brigade) which had been fighting its way through the
jungle-clad tangle of mountains from Wau towards Salamaua since January.
The Australians rapidly advanced towards Salamaua but Savige ordered
that the Japanese were not to be pressed so hard that would cause an
early evacuation of Salamaua.
Salamaua Falls
On 26 August, Savige and his 3rd Division headquarters were relived
by General Milford and his 5th Division headquarters. The 5th Division
conducted the final operations around Salamaua which was occupied by the
42nd Battalion on 11 September, a week
after the Lae offensive opened and five days before the 7th and 9th
Australian Divisions entered Lae.
The 3rd Division's long winter campaign of 1943 achieved impressive
strategic gains. A great part of the strength of the XVIII Japanese Army
had been diverted from the areas which were to be the objectives of the
offensive which could not be mounted until the spring, when veteran
divisions would be rested and retrained, landing craft available, and
air superiority increased. At the same time immensely valuable
experience had been gained in jungle tactics and in methods of supply.
For the first time Australian infantry and independent companies had
worked closely together in a lengthy campaign and each had learnt from
the other. Artillery had been used on a scale hitherto unattained in
mountain warfare in New Guinea. Doctrines were developed which gave the
Australians decisive tactical and administrative superiority over the
Japanese in bush warfare. In the six months to August 1943 the strength
of the XVIII Japanese Army had been depleted and dispersed while, behind
the front on which the 3rd Australian Division fought, the Allied
strength in the South West Pacific had greatly increased.
|
